It is largely believed by now that the recent missile launch by Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea was a failure even if one believes that it was a satellite launch. What was sent in the sky was a modified version of Taepodong-2 with ICBM potential (striking range of 5500 kilometers or greater). In the only previous test flight of the Taepodong-2, the rocket blew apart 40 seconds after the launch. This had raised alarms in the international community. The current test is widely believed to be that of a long-range missile as agencies have found no new satellite placed in the orbit after the North Korean test. Moreover, if the North Korean test was considered successful then the alarms are real as the missile has a strike capability of 6,700 kilometers and can hit as far as Alaska.
Whether the North Korea was successful in its test and why it conducted this test in the first place will be debated for some time to come but one observation of the People’s Republic of China’s reaction to the event tells of something more serious underneath. As discussed below, the reactions coming from the People’s Republic representatives was to tone down the crisis and it pressed for diplomatic solutions. The reactions by the world community were sharp and critical of the test. President Obama of the United States called the test as a threat to Northeast Asian security and a provocative and dangerous act. South Korean foreign affairs minister called it violation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1718. He also spoke of his government’s readiness to any provocation by the North Korea. Japan also called it unprovoked as well as provocative and called for collective strong response, again citing 1718 as the base for collective action. Another power Russia called for collective action but its language was more measured and not like the three mentioned above. While the world was calling for stringent reply in their reactions, the Chinese response was more measured and it tried to reduce the intensity of the moment. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi called the world "to look at the larger picture and avoid taking actions which may exacerbate the situation" in a Foreign Ministry statement. Similar statement was made by China’s permanent representative to the UNSC.
It looks like the Chinese approach to North Korea is driven more by its immediate concerns rather than by its global outlook or that China is not able to drive home its perspective as far as the North Korean leadership is concerned. If that is the case then there is a reason to worry about China’s ability of becoming responsible great power.
At the first glance, PRC’s approach to North Korea appears to be guided by pragmatism that it is better to have a unpredictable and rogue regime, however failed it may be, than a failed state as one’s neighbor which will create humanitarian crisis for the People’s Republic. It looks like China’s primary objective about North Korea is to ensure that the regime does not collapse. China is the immediate neighbour of North Korea with whom it shares 800 kms of international border. If the international pressure and sanctions lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime then the fragile state is bound to implode.
Even if it were right that the PRC the biggest ally of North Korea, PRC does not get from North Korea what it would like to. North Korean leadership has been unpredictable at best. Therefore, China prefers the ambiguity about the North Korean nuclear and missile capability to pushing it too hard to declare its capability and face another crisis in the region. China would very much love to see the North Korean problem solved in a peaceful manner. However, it does not seem to be willing to take responsibility for this, as it does not want to create a humanitarian problem for itself.
The second reason why China tried to downplay the North Korean missile/satellite test is that by going openly vocal against the test and criticizing the North Korean regime, it does not want this failed test to become a pretext for increased American military presence in the region and increases in the Japanese defense budgets. It will surely want to reduce the chances of a military confrontation with the United States in its backyard. It could also have not criticized North Korea and then opposed the military presence or intervention or it would have to face the criticisms of doublespeak. Therefore, it is only trying to play safe.
In some ways, one can see the parallel between the Chinese approach to North Korea and the Indian approach to the present crisis in Sri Lanka. Historical experience is against these big states’ intervention in their respective neighbors’ crises. Therefore, however strong the will to see peace in the region, hands of these countries are tied down as far as their ability to act is concerned. Consequently, one sees a gulf in what they wish and what they can achieve on their own. This explains the apparent contradictory approach of China towards North Korea. China voted for the UNSC Resolution 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea in the wake of its nuclear test in 2006 and it is trying to downplay the contemporary crisis.
Historically, relations between the two neighbours were warm when the two were communist states. That also led to the signing of the treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the two. However, much has changed since the signing of that treaty, most important of it the idea of communism that these countries adhere to is vastly different from what it was when the treaty first came in 1967 and vastly different from each other’s ideas as well. What this means is that China-North Korea relation is based on a document that many in China feel is dated. Still China does not have enough room to walk out of the treaty given the regional and global implications if North Korea stood isolated in the present world. This is precisely the dilemma facing the Chinese leadership about North Korea.
The question of how the Chinese approach to the present North Korean crisis reflects on its great power ambitions and methods is a more serious one. China wants to be different from the United States and the erstwhile USSR’s interventionist policy. However, on the present North Korean Crisis China will benefit more by playing an active role rather than using a wait and watch policy. In that sense, it will not help the world order if China indeed became the great power, as great powers do not fight for brownie points alone! Thus, China’s proximity to North Korea, geographical as well as diplomatic is hurting China’s regional interest and its global aspirations along with harming its image as a responsible great power.
References
1. Erich Marquardt (2003), "China's Support for North Korea Lies in its Fear of the United States'', PINR, 3 September 2003, Accessesed 22 April 2009, URL: http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=85&language_id=1
2. Jayshree Bajoria (2008), "The China-North Korea Relationship", Washington Post Online, 2 July 2008, Accessed 22 April 2009, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/02/AR2008070201133.html
3. Jayashri Bajoria (2008), "The China North Korea Relationship", 18 June 2008, Council on Foreign Relations, Online, Accessed 22 April 2009 URL: http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth_korea_relationship.html
4. Shen Dingli (2009), "China tires of Pyongyang’s Antics", 28 April 2009, Asia Times Online, Accessed 28 April, URL; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KD28Ad01.html
5. International Crisis Group (2006), China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?", ICG Website, Accessed 24 April 2009, URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/north_korea/112_china_and_north_korea_comrades_forever.pdf
6. Reuters Alertnet (2009), "World Reaction to the North Korea Rocket Launch", 5 April 2009, Accessed 6 May 2009, URL: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP279217.htm
7. Xinhua (2009), "China: UN reaction to DPRK launch should be 'cautious'", 6 April 2009, China Daily Website, Accessed 6 May 2009, URL http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-04/06/content_7651211.htm
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