Developments on Non-proliferation in G-8
P K Sundaram
The Joint Statement on nonproliferation by the G-8 countries has come at a crucial time. Internationally, it has implications for the ongoing debate on nonproliferation and disarmament in the run-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and nationally, it has started speculation whether the statement would impinge upon India’s right to ENR (Enrichment and Reprocessing) technologies, to which the country was allowed access in the event of the Indo-US nuclear deal, under the IAEA safeguards and NSG guidelines.
The statement covers a wide range of issues including re-invigorating and universalizing of the NPT regime, welcoming arms-reduction between US and Russia, strengthening effective and credible safeguards, security and verification of the nuclear fuel cycle under the aegis of the IAEA, urging early entry into force of the CTBT, negotiating a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), establishment of a nuclear fuel bank, and strengthening of the NSG mechanism on transfer of Enrichment and reprocessing.
The statement also extends support to international efforts on other key issues such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on preventing non-state actors from obtaining WMDs, other counter proliferation measures such as GICNT and PSI, full and effective implementation of CWC and BTWC, peaceful negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme, the positive developments in the 2009 meeting of Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction launched at Kananaskis in 2002. The G-8 statement also urges North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – DPRK) to abide by UNSCRs 1695, 1718 and 1874, not to conduct any further nuclear tests and return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations.
On the NSG Mechanism
The G-8 joint statement has urged the NSG to come up with “strengthened mechanism on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipments, and technology” this year. It calls for implementation of the “clean text” developed at the NSG Consultative Group meeting on 20 November 2008.
Strengthening of the NSG guidelines, which as of now provide only for a general "restraint" in sensitive exports, has been on the G-8 agenda for a quite a few years. In the 2007 joint statement, the G-8 countries express their “regret that they (the NSG) did not reach a consensus on this issue by 2007 as called for (at the 2006 G-8 summit) in St. Petersburg,” The G-8 had further added “Should the NSG not reach consensus on appropriate criteria by 2008, we will seriously consider alternative strategies to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.”
Would adoption of a strengthened mechanism mean a curtailment of India’s access to ENR technology? NSG guidelines on nuclear technology transfer denied such access to India, Pakistan and Israel – the three non-signatories to the NPT – until September 2008 when India was granted an exemption. Access to “full scope cooperation” in civil nuclear sector, including the ENR technology, was touted as one of the key gains in the Indo-US nuclear deal. However, the US simultaneously had started pushing for a general NPT conditionality for ENR technologies in the NSG guidelines.
This development is likely to lead to different interpretations of the NSG waiver and the new conditionalities by the different players. The costs of these differing interpretations have also become high as India has not concluded nuclear sales deal with either Russia or France. India has sought to open the nuclear sector first for the US companies adopting a gesture of gratitude for the cooperation. If the NSG comes with additional conditions in its general rules in immediate future, India might loose an opportunity to source sensitive nuclear technology from Russia and France. India can build Enrichment and Reprocessing facilities indigenously, but that would mean unnecessary huge investments, which could be saved if these items could be imported under the nuclear deal.
On NPT, CTBT and FMCT
The G-8 statement calls for “universalisation and reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime” and urges “upon all the States still not party to the NPT, CWC and BTWC to accede without delay”. Thus, the statement underlines the fact that NPT priority in Obama’s disarmament agenda has found resonance and urgency among all the developed nations. On the issue of CTBT, the G-8 states have said that they will “intensify efforts towards the early entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT”. The statement also urges for early commencement of negotiation on FMCT “with verification provisions”.
The statement holds NPT as the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and identifies non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament as its three pillars. The statement also resolves that the G-8 countries will “work together so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty’s regime and set realistic and achieveable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars. This definitely would mean increased pressure on India in coming months to accede to NPT and CTBT – treaties which the country has kept away from, sighting their loose ends and discriminatory nature. Any decision on these treaties would also evoke animated domestic political responses.
On Global Disarmament
On the issue of universal disarmament, the statement underlines several recent developments and urges nations to work in unison to create conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. The G-8 statement has nothing new and concrete to offer on disarmament. However, it shows a renewed impetus and a fresh expression of will on part of the developed countries to pursue disarmament. By taking into account counterproliferation issues, North Korea and Iran and Code of Conduct against Ballistic Misslies, the statement underlines the need to adopt a practical and negotiation-based approach. It can only be hoped that this momentum translates into some actual gains for disarmament in the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
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P K SUNDARAM
Asian Nuclear, Missile & Space Digest - Vol 1, No. 34
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India in a Changing Global Nuclear Order