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3/27/2008 [Total Votes: 461, Hits: 540]Print

ARUN VISHWANATHAN

In the domestic hullabaloo surrounding the Indo-US Civil Nuclear cooperation, the US-Russian decision to open negotiations on the Civil nuclear cooperation agreement on the eve of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg did not receive much attention. The Bush-Putin Joint Statement stated that the agreement would help to "facilitate the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy worldwide."¹ As mentioned in the joint statement as well as in the course of the subsequent joint press briefing, the agreement envisions cooperation in a wide range of issues. The major highlights are the development of advanced reactor technologies, storage and possible reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel in Russia, and production of mixed-oxide (MOX, a mix of plutonium and uranium oxides) fuel. The Bush administration also hopes the agreement will advance the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, a U.S. initiative announced in February 2006 to promote the use of nuclear energy as a clean alternative to fossil fuels, while limiting the spread of certain types of nuclear facilities that pose significant proliferation risks.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been talk of reaching a formal nuclear cooperation between the US and Russia. Thus, the current initiative should not come as a surprise for US-Russia watchers. Till recently however, American concerns about continued Russian assistance to the Iranian nuclear programme had held back any positive movement on this issue. Since the 2002 IAEA inspections, that brought to light many previously unknown facts about the Iranian nuclear programme, Russia has been more wiling to exert pressure on Iran to curtail the development of its nuclear programme. The Russian efforts have been focussed on ensuring that Iran does not engage in enrichment activities.

In the fall of 2005, to achieve this end Russia proposed an arrangement under which Iran would end its uranium enrichment activities in return for a Russian guarantee to enrich, in Russia, all uranium needed for Iranian nuclear power plants. Iran rejected the Russian proposal saying that the offer denied "the Iranian right to be in charge of its own fate on energy matters."² During his January 2006 address at the Eurasian Economic Community in St. Petersburg the Russian President Putin proposed the establishment of International Nuclear Centers. He said that "such centers should serve, among other things, to enrich nuclear fuel under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency." In a bid to encourage Iranian involvement in the initiative he also mentioned that "these centers should remain open to all countries without discrimination."³ When the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov pressed for an unambiguous response to the proposal, the Iranian embassy in Moscow suggested that "such a center should be set up in Tehran along with the involvement of other countries."⁴

The crisis reached a head with Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad announcing that Iran had managed to enrich uranium to the level required for use in nuclear power reactors.⁵ The danger however is that, the same enrichment technology can also be put to use to enrich the uranium to make it weapons-grade, meaning that it could be used in nuclear weapons. Subsequently, Russia joined the US at the IAEA Board of Governors in February 2006 and voted in favour of reporting Iranian non-compliance with the NPT to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Russia also supported the UNSC Resolution 1696 that called on Iran to "suspend its uranium-enrichment activities by the end of August or face possible economic/diplomatic sanctions."⁶ With the perceptible shift in the Russian policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme and the difficulties that the US faces in Iraq, the US realised that it was important to engage with Russia on the issue. Also, due to their economic/energy interests in Iran, Russia and China have emerged as important players as they exercise some amount of leverage on the Iranian administration.

It was during a visit of the Russian Federal Nuclear Agency (Rosatom) chief, Sergey Kiriyenko's visit to the US in May 2006 that the United States and Russia agreed in principle to open talks on a bilateral nuclear cooperation pact. As compared to a civil nuclear agreement with a non-nuclear weapon state, the Bush administration might find it easier to manoeuvre the deal through the Congress as in such a case the stipulation is that the agreement be placed before the Congress for 90 days for its approval or objections. In the Congress rejects the agreement, the President can use his veto power and the Congress would require a two-thirds majority to override the presidential veto. In the past such agreements between the US and other countries have taken between nine months and a couple of years to negotiate and finalise. It has been estimated that the US-Russian negotiations would take somewhere between one to two years.

The most important legislative task before the US administration before the agreement can be implemented would be negotiating a "Section 123 Agreement" which details the particular terms under which the transfer of nuclear materials would be covered. What the "Section 123 Agreement" includes is a pledge by the recipient government that material and equipment transferred under the agreement will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, that the United States will have the right to approve the retransfer to third countries of any items transferred under the agreement, and that the United States will have the right to approve any enrichment or reprocessing involving U.S.-origin material or equipment transferred under the agreement. Thus, it would be premature to conclude that the negotiations on the US-Russia civil nuclear agreement would be an easy affair just because Russia is a nuclear weapon state.

Areas of possible Cooperation

The US-Russia civil nuclear cooperation is a part of a larger process of engagement that the two countries have launched in the recent months. Apart from the nuclear agreement the US and Russia have also decided to cooperate to combat nuclear terrorism. The decision to cooperate to combat nuclear terrorism is one that is intrinsically linked to the current initiative to arrive at a civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries.

This is because of the fact that it is seen that the nuclear agreement would encourage Russian participation in the US-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). It was in February 2006 that the U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman announced the GNEP initiative. The initiative aims to promote the use of nuclear energy, while limiting its potential to contribute to proliferation. US-Russian cooperation on the GNEP would certainly help in the development of proliferation-resistant technologies, including advanced "burner" reactors. The advantage of using such reactors over traditional reactors is that they would reduce the amount of plutonium remaining in spent reactor fuel and, it is hoped, that this would not only reduce proliferation risks but also the amount of radioactive waste needing long-term management. Experts agree that Russia has more operating experience in the field of advanced reactors. However, having the experience is one thing and successful adoption of the technology in the international market is quite a different ball game altogether. It is here that Russia could benefit from American endorsement and cooperation.⁷

Another important area of possible cooperation is the enrichment of US uranium at Russian facilities. This could be crucially important for the US as it currently has only one enrichment facility at Paducah, Kentucky and it is likely that this facility might not be able to meet future requirements. The conclusion of the agreement could thus clear all legal hurdles, in the way of Russian facilities being used to enrich American uranium. Given President's Putin's earlier statements in this regard, the Russians will only be too happy to extend such cooperation taking into account the positive financial implications flowing from it.

The US-Russian agreement would most likely facilitate Russian participation in the development of a new-generation reactor within the Generation IV International Forum (GIF). The US Department of Energy (DOE) launched the Generation IV initiative in 2000. Today, it groups 10 member countries plus EURATOM, with the aim of developing innovative nuclear systems (reactors and fuel cycles) likely to reach technical maturity by 2030. The forum's Policy Group voted in June 2006 to admit Russia as a member.⁸

Another area, where the nuclear cooperation between the two countries could support the GNEP is storing of spent nuclear plant fuel in Russia. The conclusion of an agreement between the two countries would remove the legal glitches in transferring US-origin spent fuel to Russia that has been used in other counties.⁹ In 2001, sizing up the huge economic benefits such an arrangement would entail, Russia passed a legislation permitting the import of foreign spent fuel.¹⁰ It has been estimated that Russia could rake in approximately $20 billion in storage fees from countries like Japan, South Korea, and several others, if this agreement goes through. What is crucial to understand is that of the spent nuclear fuel in the possession of potential customers approximately 95 percent is of US origin and thus under the control of US.¹¹

The Americans realise that storage of spent nuclear fuel in Russia could support the GNEP. An important goal of the initiative is to discourage states which do not currently possess enrichment or reprocessing facilities from acquiring such capabilities in future. Instead what the GNEP proposes to do is to ensure that these states would receive enriched uranium fuel produced in countries already possessing enrichment plants and would transfer the spent fuel to another state already possessing reprocessing facilities, such as France, Japan, or Russia. As the Bush administration realises that storage of the spent fuel within US would not be possible due to the strong protests against any such move by the environmental groups, Russia would be the key to the success of the initiative.¹²

The proposed nuclear cooperation between Russia and the US is beneficial for both parties. The US gains a valuable partner first in its attempt to curb the Iranian nuclear weapons programme and in the GNEP initiative. Russia stands to gain substantial revenues from spent fuel management.

End Notes:

[1] "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President V. V. Putin on Cooperation in Civil Nuclear Energy," 17 July 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/prsrl/69045.htm

 [2] Shirzad Bozorgmehr, "Iran rejects Russian nuclear offer," 2 January 2006, CNN, available at http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/01/iran.nuclear/index.html

[3] "Russia Offers To Host International Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Center," 25 January 2006, Radio Free Europe, available at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/01/16ba7f13-f93a-461c-b81d-7f63d0dbeed9.html

[4] "Tehran Wants Nuclear Fuel Center In Iran," 28 March 2006, Radio Free Europe, available at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/3/F561B943-F472-4DE9-BBF6-42FEC81EC3EF.html

[5] "Iran declares key nuclear advance," 11 April 2006, BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4900260.stm

[6] "Security Council demands Iran suspend Uranium enrichment by 31 August, or face possible economic, diplomatic sanctions," 31 July 2006, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm

[7] "Russia, USA expected to move forward on civilian nuclear cooperation," 8 July 2006, USA Today, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-07-08-russiausa-nuclear_x.htm

[8] "G8 affirms major role of nuclear power," available at www.world-nuclear.org/news/nl_jul-aug2006.htm

[9] "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President V. V. Putin on Cooperation in Civil Nuclear Energy," 17 July 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/prsrl/69045.htm

[10] Philipp Bleek, "Russian Duma Passes Bill Allowing Import of Spent Fuel," Arms Control Today, July/August 2001, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_07-08/dumajul_aug01.asp

[11] Peter Baker, "U.S. and Russia to Enter Civilian Nuclear Pact," 8 July 2006, Washington Post, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/07/AR2006070701588.html

[12] Ibid

Related Tags:

St. Petersburg, Bush-Putin Joint Statement, Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation, G8 Summit, Advanced Reactor Technologies, Nuclear Fuel in Russia, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, Cold War, Uranium Enrichment Activities, Iranian Nuclear Power Plants, International Nuclear Centers, International Atomic Energy Agency, UN Security Council, UNSC Resolution 1696, Russian Federal Nuclear Agency, Nuclear Weapon State, Enrich American Uranium, Generation IV International Forum

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